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Snead on Tudda
tinually used ambiguous and often bellicose rhetoric
that actually increased tensions, not only with the
Kremlin but also their own allies–the exact opposite
of what they intended.

As with most historical subjects, the historiography of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency has undergone its share of adjustments and readjustments
over the past fifty years. The gradual release of previously declassified materials over the last twenty-five
years has allowed for more nuanced interpretations
of his presidency, yet no true consensus has emerged.
The golf-playing do-little president described by some
in the 1960s gave way to the strong “hidden hand”
president interpretation in the 1980s.[1] Now Christopher Tudda offers a new assessment that shows Eisenhower as an active president but one who was not
very effective. Tudda makes an interesting and powerful argument that Eisenhower and his secretary of
state, John Foster Dulles, pursued rhetorical diplomacy that severely hampered and, at times, impeded
their efforts to achieve the goals they set. While not
always convincing, Tudda’s interpretation will force
historians to re-examine their views of the Eisenhower presidency and the role of public diplomacy
in decision-making.

Tudda argues that Eisenhower and Dulles’s
rhetoric in their public statements and in their private meetings with their allies and enemies exaggerated the threat of the Soviet Union and expounded
the dangers of unilateralism. This rhetoric sharply
contrasted with their policy goals that were dependent on careful and cautious thought. The disconnect between the rhetoric and their actual deliberations hampered their efforts to achieve any of their
goals. Tudda initially explores the backgrounds of
both Dulles and Eisenhower and concludes that each
of them had a long history of using rhetoric that did
not reflect their true beliefs. He argues: “Even as
Dulles publicly preached toughness and confrontation with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, close
examination of the documentary record reveals that
he confidentially counseled moderation and restraint”
(p. 25). He found that Eisenhower shared many of
Dulles’s views and used rhetoric in similar ways. The
result, Tudda explains, is that Eisenhower and Dulles
“publicly pledged to pursue an activist foreign policy,
including the pursuit of military, political, and economic unity in Western Europe, promised to liberate Eastern Europe, and endorsed the reunification
of Germany on Western terms. All the while they
secretly strove for coexistence with the Soviet Union
and settled for the status quo in Europe” (p. 47).

Tudda uses three case studies to examine the
Eisenhower administration’s rhetoric and the deleterious effect it had on its policy goals. He explores the
fight for the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC), the administration’s public call for
the liberation of Eastern Europe, and Eisenhower’s
desire for a reunited Germany. Tudda concludes that
Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles “failed to understand the power of words in a climate of insecurity
brought about by the Cold War. Their confidential decision to ease world tensions failed because
Eisenhower and Dulles could not reconcile this with
their determination to pursue rhetorical diplomacy”
(p. 15). More specifically, while privately recognizing
the need to coexist with the Soviet Union, they con-

Eisenhower and Dulles believed the EDC was the
centerpiece of European security, yet Tudda contends
that they failed to develop a coherent public message
that actually supported their goals. Instead their
public statements made many French and other Euro1

H-Net Reviews

pean statesmen fear American unilateralism as much
as communism. Furthermore, the American leaders’
continued pressure on France to increase its commitment to fighting communism in Vietnam while the
United States was publicly implying a possible reduction in its military presence in Europe did nothing to
encourage confidence. The end result was that the
French refused to support the EDC.

ropean nations needed. This failure intensified the
Cold War–just the opposite of what Eisenhower desired. In the end, Tudda concludes, “Eisenhower’s
public rhetoric angered the allies even as he secretly
pursued policies ostensibly designed to accommodate
their needs” (p. 127).
Tudda has written a powerful book that will
force historians of the Eisenhower administration
to re-examine their interpretations and historians
more generally to evaluate the importance of public rhetoric. Tudda could have strengthened his arguments by more clearly examining what alternatives
Eisenhower did have, especially within the constraints
of domestic political realities, and developed more
clearly the influence of Eisenhower’s rhetoric on other
countries’ policies. He has clearly shown that it did
have influence, but by focusing almost exclusively on
the rhetoric used by the Eisenhower administration,
he unintentionally minimizes other factors that influence policy development. In other words, would a
more conciliatory and less bellicose public diplomacy
have produced different foreign policy results? Tudda
believes so, but his point is not proven conclusively.

After his examination of the EDC, Tudda addresses the United States’s policies towards Eastern
Europe. He contends that Eisenhower and his advisers knew that public calls for liberation of Eastern
Europe “would force the Soviet Union to react violently to any threats, real or imagined” (p. 75). However, they also knew that abandoning these “captive
peoples” to communist rule would not play well in
the domestic political arena. That, in Tudda’s eyes,
led Eisenhower and Dulles to make “ambiguous and
dangerous statements” (p.75). He asserts that the
Eisenhower administration “had failed to truly think
through its rhetorical strategy and could not reconcile
its public information campaign with its confidential
repudiation of military liberation” (p. 86). The result
was that their rhetoric encouraged many Eastern EuRegardless of this criticism, Tudda has done what
ropeans to believe incorrectly that the United States any good historian should do. He makes you think
would provide aid if they indeed sought to break away and re-evaluate previously held positions. Future
from Soviet control.
studies of the 1950s will have to take into consideration how successful Eisenhower was in devising policy
Tudda continues his critique of Eisenhower’s poligoals and in articulating them to various audiences
cies by challenging the president’s private belief in
ranging from the general public to the Soviet Union.
a conciliatory approach to the reunification of GerTudda clearly shows in the areas he examined that
many, while pursuing a confrontational public stance.
Eisenhower could have at least done a better job of
Tudda stresses that “Eisenhower and Dulles consisexplaining U.S. goals and offering more appealing reatently used bellicose rhetoric in an effort to convince
sons for countries to follow the American lead. By not
the West of the danger of a permanently divided Gerdoing so, Tudda concludes that Eisenhower failed to
many, and tried to force the Soviets to agree to Gerachieve his primary strategic goal–reduced tensions
man reunification on Western terms” (p. 103). The
with the Soviet Union.
problem was that European countries feared a reuniNote
fied Germany almost as much as the Soviet Union;
therefore, the Eisenhower administration’s rhetoric
[1]. Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presactually encouraged Soviet resistance to reunification idency: Eisenhower as Leader (Baltimore: Johns
while failing to provide the assurance Western Eu- Hopkins University Press, 1982).
If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the list discussion logs at:
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl.
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